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Abstract: Ng’s laudable concern for animal welfare would be welcome to any sensible slave-
owner wishing to preserve his investment. What welfarism – for slave-owners and animal 
husbandmen – fails to call into question is whether we have the right to breed, hold captive 
and kill animals at all: If it matters, as the widely recognized slogan of ‘Five Freedoms’ 
suggests, that animals have the chance to live a ‘normal’ life, then more matters than 




Stephen R. L. Clark is Emeritus 
Professor of Philosophy, University 
of Liverpool, and Honorary 
Research Fellow, University of 
Bristol. His books include The Moral 
Status of Animals (1977), The 
Nature of the Beast (1982), How to 
Think about the Earth (1993), Animals and Their Moral 
Standing (1997), Biology and Christian Ethics (2000), and 




According to the Book of Proverbs (12.10) ‘a righteous man regardeth the life of his beast: 
but the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel.’ Such ‘mercies’ include debeaking chickens 
and castrating cattle, horses, and dogs to alleviate aggression. It is to the credit of Ng (2016) 
that he is concerned to relieve the suffering of domesticated (and some wild) animals by 
better means, and seeks to assure them some enjoyment – as long, that is, as we may 
continue to use them. 
 
Slave-owners, of course, might have practised a similar care: slaves are valuable property (at 
least until old age, disease or injury diminishes their value) and sensible slave-owners take 
care of their health and even – in a way – their ‘happiness.’ Slaves may also rebel if pushed 
too far – and all slave-owning societies live in terror of the coming judgment. Domesticated 
animals are less likely to mount an organized rebellion (though individuals may sometimes 
snap), but sensible farmers still don’t goad their bulls, even their sheep or cockerels, too far. 
 
So ‘welfarists’ are the farmers’ friends – pointing to better ways of managing the stock, and 
also (of course) alleviating some of the guilt that farmers may feel for what they do to the 
animals for whom they often feel affection. At least, we can be persuaded, these purpose-
bred animals aren’t unduly stressed, and some may have easier lives than their counterparts 
‘in the wild.’ Unlike most human slaves, they don’t understand their subjection, and have – it 





is argued – no strong wish to live their lives in freedom. Bad farmers, we keep being told – 
those who do not care at all how ‘their’ animals feel or live – are likely also to be 
unprofitable farmers, precisely because they cannot distinguish their own complacent 
perspectives from the actual facts. Good husbandry – in every area of animal management – 
depends on a good understanding of animals, and a clear sight of the costs of careless 
management, to the animals and to their owners. 
 
None of this touches the fundamental problem, however: whether it can be right to enslave, 
imprison, mutilate and kill our cousins. Ng rightly rejects the hypothesis that ‘animals’ are no 
more than automata, as senseless as rocks or bushes, though more mobile. Nowadays any 
idea that ‘animals’ and ‘humans’ are so radically distinct can be maintained only by wilful 
rejection of the evidence of evolutionary history and shared bodily natures – shared DNA, 
shared viruses, shared anatomical structures. We are not just rather like animals: we are 
animals (Midgley 2002, p. xxxiii), and know what it’s like to be so ‘from within.’  
 
But there is another presupposition still at work. Those who acknowledge that non-human 
animals are sentient, or even somewhat intelligent, may still believe – as slavers believed of 
slaves – that their lives and purposes are unimportant, that they don’t deserve respect. Ng is 
concerned with animal feelings, the balance of suffering and enjoyment. It is enough that 
those in our care (?) are ‘happy’ (or happy enough), without wondering whether their lives 
have value. But consider the ‘Five Freedoms’ identified by the United Kingdom’s Farm 
Animal Welfare Council (FAWC 2009) as the basis for assessing animal welfare. Four of these 
are uncontroversially ‘welfarist’: freedom from hunger and thirst; from discomfort; from 
pain, injury and disease; and freedom from fear and distress. The remaining freedom is more 
controversial, and more difficult to define: the freedom to express normal behaviour, 
allowed by ‘providing sufficient space, proper facilities and appropriate company of the 
animal’s own kind.’  
 
The Council acknowledged that ‘these definitions of good welfare do not place an explicit 
moral value on maintaining or extending the lifespan of a farm animal.…On the one hand it 
seems to many people to be commonsense that healthy animals, experiencing a good quality 
of life, lose out by having their lives prematurely terminated. On the other hand, farm 
animals clearly [sic] cannot imagine the future to anything like the extent that [adult?] 
humans can. In that sense, it is widely held that they lose very little by having their lives 
prematurely terminated so long, of course, as that is done humanely.’  
 
Identical rationales are used in other contexts, and even by some owners of ‘companion 
animals’: it will almost always be cheaper to kill an animal than cure it, or otherwise alleviate 
its distress. How humane the killing may be is moot: the swiftest – and cheapest – method of 
killing surplus male chicks is to have them shredded, by ‘Instantaneous Mechanical 
Destruction’, in well-maintained, clean grinders (HSA 2005). But at least the acknowledged 
importance of ‘normal lives,’ lives well-lived according to their kind, goes beyond the mere 
assessment of their ‘net happiness’ (‘enjoyment minus suffering’). However grudgingly, the 
Council acknowledged the ‘commonsense’ belief that animals may find their lives worth 
living if they are allowed to live them (that is, to find their places in their social worlds, and 
accomplish something of what they are formed to wish, even if it is only to stretch, bathe, 
breed, and play). Killing them is at least not a neutral act, and neither is enslaving them. 






One last comment: Ng is right that we know too little of wild animals to much improve their 
lives – our efforts, indeed, would probably make things worse. But we could begin by not 
using painful means to control or kill them, and not destroying their habitats. We may have 
fewer duties of care toward wild animals: we may still have duties not to harm them (see 
Clark 1997, pp. 16-30). It is not only domestic animals, after all, that we have damaged: we 
are living through what is justly called ‘the Sixth Extinction’ (Leakey & Lewin 1996), 
destroying habitats and poisoning the seas. Until we can come to terms with the revelation 
that we are, in Leopold’s phrase, ‘all fellow voyagers in the odyssey of evolution’ (Leopold 
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